

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Camp Coordination and Camp Management Best Practice Review</b></p>
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## **Introduction**

The Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster has established this Best Practices Review document to gather and analyze methods and tools related to this aspect of Humanitarian IDP response in displacement settings. The CCCM Best Practice guideline uses a holistic approach to camp coordination and management – taking into consideration human and social aspects of displacement in a camp/camp-like settings, in addition to the various services that are provided to internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The document targets field based IDP practitioners (including NGOs, INGOs, national authorities, UN, International Organizations and community based organizations) with varying levels of experience in IDP response, and is designed to be a resource for learning and concept exchange to enhance the level of protection and assistance provided to existing and future displaced populations.

The Camp Coordination and Camp Management cluster started a discussion on CCCM best practices at the validation workshop which the cluster organized in Entebbe (Uganda) in April 2006. This issue was further explored at the CCCM cluster workshop in Islamabad (Pakistan) in November 2006, where the cluster decided to develop best practices guidelines a useful and practical tool for field personnel involved in camp management and coordination. The CCCM Cluster again updated the document in a validation workshop held in November 2007 in Dar es Salaam Tanzania. CCCM Cluster members revised the document structure and provided new inputs that are reflected in this latest iteration of the best practice review.

There was discussion at the Tanzania Validation workshop over the definition of and criteria for a CCCM Best Practice. For the purposes of this document, the CCCM Best Practice is defined as any approach or methodology that improved humanitarian response techniques and outcomes towards displaced populations. The document also includes converse examples to share ideas on how and why some interventions were not successful.

Based on discussions held with representatives from the global cluster and field practitioners, it was proposed to examine 'best practices' issues related to camp coordination and camp management according to the following list:

1. Information Management
  - Information Management techniques and practices (database, information flow etc.)
  - Data collection
  - Data dissemination
  - Data to be expanded and to include reference to: the monitoring of trends over time and information management, to include systems for disseminating information to camp residents.
  - Focus on targeted and useful data collection rather than large scale, un-used data banks with a focus on quality not quantity.
2. Empowerment
  - Empowerment and capacity building for local communities and authorities, and CM staff and cluster members
3. Definitions and Standards
  - Working with agreed definitions and standards and indicators
  - Should include setting of standards: 'how was this done?' – how was agreement reached on which standards to use.
  - Common definitions: 'how did this help?'
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4. Camp Infrastructure
  - Ensuring development and care and maintenance of camp infrastructure
  - Should include examples of site planning/selection and handover of facilities (liaison with government)
  - How has community maintained/owned the infrastructure?

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5. Identification of Gaps and Duplication
  - Identifying gaps and duplication in assistance and protection
  - Should be combined and links between the two shown to improve situation
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6. Camp Coordinator
  - Building relationships
7. Mainstreaming
  - Ensuring that protection, age, gender, status participation and environment are mainstreamed with a particular focus on vulnerable groups
  - Examples of how cross cutting issues like gender, and HIV/AIDS have been successfully incorporated into CCCM.
8. Coordination
  - Coordinating services of assistance and protection within a camp
  - Coordinating services of assistance and protection amongst camps
9. Human Rights
  - Ensuring provision of services assistance/protection in line with fundamental human rights
  - Human rights based approach programming
  - Examples of how rights were upheld and situation improved
10. Empowerment
  - Empowering and capacity building
11. Partnership
  - Developing partnerships with all on-site stakeholders and service providers
  - Diversity and inclusiveness of partnerships with service providers – across different sectors and according to different agendas and capacities.
  - Camp Administration (government authorities) to be added to the partnerships concepts.
  - CCCM membership criteria
  - Encourage diverse partnerships that add value to CCCM
  - Transparency/accountability
  - Good practice of cooperation with all stakeholders, including Camp Coordination and Camp Administration bodies.
12. Community Participation
  - Developing governance, mobilization and community participation with camp residents and host community
  - Community participation – to include the concept of responsibility to further encourage community mobilization and to challenge a dependency culture.
  - Should include improved relations between host communities, IDPs, civil/military authorities
13. Durable Solutions
  - Working towards the identification and implementation of durable solutions
  - Clear link with early recovery
  - Examples of successful return and freedom of movement/voluntary return (including advocacy with government)
  - Including camp phase-out
14. Monitoring
  - Monitoring standards and best practice to ensure effective response

In addition, the following issues in relation to Camp Coordination and Camp Management could be examined:.

15. Security and safety
16. Conflict resolution
17. Understanding of and sensitivity to local cultural norms and practices
18. Do No Harm
19. Host community relationships
20. Transparency of camp management activities

**Methodology**

In preparation for the OCHA-led Cluster/Sector Lead Training (CSLT) which was initiated in 2007, the various clusters/sectors were requested to provide ‘best practices’ from their respective clusters. The global CCCM cluster contacted field operations where the CCCM clusters had been activated as a separate cluster or operated as a sector under another cluster, and requested their inputs by answering the following questions:

- What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?
- How were the challenges overcome?
- What was the result?

The 2007 CCCM Validation Workshop in Tanzania further updated the structure of the best practice document to provide more details on methodology and program design. In addition, workshop participants added significant new data to the review. The CCCM Cluster conducts ongoing consultations with groups and individuals within the cluster and within the humanitarian response community to enhance the document with current and relevant information and techniques. New additions to the document will follow the formula listed below, and Cluster authors are constantly updating the text to ensure that new techniques and tips are added. The latest version of the Best Practices Review is posted on the public website [www.humanitarianreform.org](http://www.humanitarianreform.org).

**Updated Best Practice Example Structure**

1. Basic information
  - name of organization
  - name of organization
  - duration of intervention
2. Specify the category of the intervention (categories listed above)
3. **Brief** description of response information and/or describe the issue/problem
4. State the intervention and the main objectives of the intervention
5. List the activities undertaken to achieve the objective
6. Methodologies applied (structure of the teams, staff etc)
  - Include qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure best practice.
7. Key messages (‘lessons learnt’)
  - In what sense do you consider the intervention as best practice?
  - What were the pre-conditions and assumptions which made the interventions as “best practice”?
8. Challenges
9. Recommendations

**Outline of Best Practice Material in this Document**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Topic</b>	<b>Displacement</b>
Ethiopia	CCCM and Access	Natural disaster
Liberia	Durable Solutions – Camp Closure	Conflict
Zimbabwe	Durable Solutions and permanent camps	Conflict
Philippines	CCCM and Partnerships	Natural disaster
Zimbabwe	Community Targeting and Participation	Natural disaster
Zimbabwe	Host Government Relations in Camp-Like Settings	Conflict
Philippines	Coordination – Building Relationships	Natural disaster
Philippines	‘Provider of Last Resort’ in Real Field Situations	Natural disaster
Zimbabwe	Provider of Last Resort in Camp-Like Environments	Conflict
Philippines	Successful Leadership/management of clusters	Natural disaster
Somalia	Information Management/Protection	Conflict
Somalia	Information Management and Inter-Cluster Coordination	Conflict
Somalia	Cluster Partnerships, Leadership and Info Management	Conflict
Timor Leste	Camp Management Mobile Teams	Conflict
Timor Leste	Conflict Sensitive Approach to Camp Management	Conflict
Timor Leste	IDP Response	Conflict
CCCM Tools Annex		
Pakistan	Rapid Response Team Equipment List	Natural disaster
Zimbabwe	ToR for National IDP Response Position	Conflict

**Ethiopia (Gambella Region)**

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>CCCM and Access</b> to provide emergency assistance to flood-affected IDPs</p>
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**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

- Identifying the victims and the total population affected
- Providing humanitarian emergency assistance to the flood victims
- Flooded rivers and impassable roads prevented access to the flood victims.
- Insecurity of the flood affected area being in a UN security phase three area situation hampered access and response to the affected areas.
- Rebel attacks causing secondary and further displacements of the flood victims making it extremely difficult to assess and identify the target population.

**How were the challenges overcome?**

- Joint Interagency needs assessment by humanitarian workers and Regional government authorities to determine the extent of damage, total population affected and gaps that needed to be filled and also to identify the capacities of the agencies for emergency response
- Providing food and Non Food Items (NFI) to flood victims in designated areas by humanitarian workers (WFP, one month's food ration, UNICEF, mosquito nets and NFI, IOM Seeds and NFI.
- Impassable roads still remain a challenge however trucks and canoes are being deployed to areas which can be accessed.
- Insecurity of the flood affected area being in a UN security phase three areas still remains a challenge. A local NGO has been sub contracted by IOM to reach out to the target population.
- Insecure areas are assessed based on UN field security briefing advice and security clearance.
- Workshops for local government authorities and NGOs to build their capacity in providing emergency response.

**What was the result?**

- Created an IDP database and photo Identity cards for the IDPs
- Provided IDP profiling and database management training to government and local NGO partners
- Enriched capacity of local government authorities and local NGOs
- A profile of IDP situation was created and the needs of those affected were identified

**Liberia**

**Durable Solutions – Camp Closure**

Development and implementation of a camp closure strategy to assess conditions including outstanding protection issues and environmental impact of IDP presence.

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

- Determine the number of registered IDPs living in former camps who had not received assistance to return home;
- Identify individuals with special needs
- Establish the level of basic services in IDP-affected areas following departure of INGO service providers
- Assess the environmental impact of IDP presence
- Make recommendations

**How were the challenges overcome?**

1. Terms of reference drafted and endorsed by the IDP Consultative Forum (policymaking group which was co-chaired by the Government and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, comprising heads of UN agencies involved in IDP issues, NGOs and IDP leaders).
2. Half-day orientation workshop held for members of the assessment team (75 persons from 19 agencies). We planned to include in each team, individuals with an expertise in interviewing and identifying protection problems, and in this respect it was proposed that NRC protection monitors and supervisors form part of the teams.
3. Field assessment conducted in 34 former IDP sites.
4. Main findings elaborated and recommendations proposed under five sections: population, protection, property, basic services and environment.
5. Findings and recommendations endorsed by the ICF. Humanitarian Coordinator undertook to mobilise resources needed for implementation.

**What was the result?**

- Verification of claims by persons alleging to be IDPs in need of assistance conducted; 5,480 claims were validated; transportation was provided to their districts of origin. No cash grants were provided; reintegration packages were distributed upon arrival at destination.
- Environmental rehabilitation activities were initiated, with priority given to demolition of abandoned shelters, safe disposal of wastes, backfilling of latrines and garbage pits, sealing of open wells due to dangers posed to communities in former IDP sites, as well as cultivation of vegetables and fruit trees.
- The Government was engaging land owners to secure land for shelter and farming purposes for vulnerable families that opted to remain.
- Assessment involving Government ministries and NGOs to determine status of communal facilities (schools, clinics, water and sanitation points) that could be rehabilitated to benefit communities.

**Zimbabwe**

**Durable Solutions in Permanent Camp-Like Settlements**

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

- There is a tendency to provide donor funding for emergency assistance without addressing the longer-term recovery needs.
- The provision of legal plots for households needs to come from government structures to reduce the risk of future displacements; although land tenure has been secured for many affected populations with IOM assistance and subsequently resulted in the provision of shelters, there is still a need to advocate further for ALL households affected.
- Challenges between the restrictions in donor assistance and what the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) required were evident; for example, the GoZ would not agree to any temporary shelter solutions or any structures that did not meet local urban standards; on the other hand, donors did not want to fund any reconstructive initiatives due to the man-made nature of the humanitarian situation (demolishing houses).
- In some cases, the provision of land tenure was not clear as beneficiaries may have received verbal confirmation that they could reside on the land, however there was no formal document to prove this.
- Addressing the long-term needs of MVPs (shelter, water and livelihood) in areas where there is still a constant threat of eviction, thereby making longer-term and permanent assistance difficult in these areas.
- Gathering accurate numbers of those affected by Operation Murambatsvina and the Fast Track Land Reform programme as some of the affected households may still be in need of assistance yet are not accessible as no nation-wide assessment has been allowed by government.

**How were the challenges overcome?**

- Continual dialogue with donors to advocate for more durable solutions/recovery for affected mobile and vulnerable (MVP/IDP) populations;
- Strong advocacy with both Government and donors to agree on the type of shelter to provide for MVP households.
- Strong advocacy with local and national government officials to secure land tenure (plots) for MVPs and reduce the potential for further eviction. This is done both by IOM and key implementing partners.
- Workshops for implementing partners to build their capacity in providing emergency response as well as raising their awareness on the situation of the affected households.
- Provision of livelihood support (technical assistance and distributions of seed and tools) for MVPs households.
- In areas where a fear of eviction is still prominent, only emergency assistance is provided with some livelihood support such as technical assistance and seed distributions. In cases where the communities are subsequently moved the type of assistance provided will enable beneficiaries to bring these inputs with them.
- Where long-term interventions (such as water and sanitation) are possible and host communities exist, the latter are involved and participate in the interventions to minimize potential for tensions between the communities: this will also ensure integration of the MVPs in the newly settled areas.
- IOM and its implementing partners also worked with the community-based committees in reaching the final decisions on the selection as well as ensuring transparency for the possible durable solutions interventions.
- IOM and its implementing partners ensure that exit strategies are appropriately included in communities that can graduate out of assistance or alternatively hand them over to other key partners with expertise in areas which IOM and its existing partners do not have a strategic advantage.

**What was the result?**

- Through continued dialogue, IOM, in coordination with the GoZ and donors (separately) worked

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- toward an agreeable solution to the materials to be used in the provision of shelter.
- IOM was able to slowly shift into transitional shelter materials as a durable solution to the shelter problems faced by affected communities.
  - Through successful negotiations, more and more communities are receiving plots. In some cases, GoZ has provided legal documents for land tenure.
  - IOM is able to provide limited recovery assistance to affected households and continues to advocate with donors increase funding for these interventions in an effort to transition from the emergency to longer-term assistance.

**Philippines (Typhoon Durian)**

**CCCM and Partnerships**

Successfully engaging “partners”, including government officials and local authorities

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

In the Philippine disaster response for Typhoon Durian, a number of issues relating to the role of government officials and local authorities were raised. For one, while there was a mechanism established at the provincial level (political subdivision in the Philippine government set-up composed of cities and municipalities), there was a pretty weak manifestation of participation from the municipal and city levels. Also, the prolonged presence of evacuation centers, and at this magnitude, was never experienced in the Province of Albay before.

**How were the challenges overcome?**

The cluster, through a working group and the coordinating task force established in the province (Ayuda Albay), went around the local government units (LGUs) to first meet with the relevant municipal mayors that led to the formal organization of technical working groups – composed of heads of offices representing planning, social welfare, health and engineering – that were tasked to coordinate needed responses.

The cluster also adopted an operational framework that defines the roles of LGUs on camp management and the coordinative/technical assistance intervention that will be provided by the cluster and the provincial government.

**What was the result?**

The entry of LGUs, more specifically through the municipal social work and development officers (MSWDOs) and in some places the technical working groups, was facilitated by the camp management cluster.

The camp management structure (through the camp chiefs) was convened and a communication mechanism was set-up. Currently, an effort to transfer technology in undertaking assessment and monitoring activities in evacuation and transit centers is underway. This will enable the camp management structures at the local level to assess the situation in the evacuation and transit centers using internationally accepted standards, and thereto harness their capacity to ensure response.

**Zimbabwe**

**Community targeting and participation**

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

- Given the economic situation in the country, IOM needed to differentiate between the economic migrant who chose to migrate to other parts of the country for better opportunities and the mobile and vulnerable populations (MVPs)<sup>1</sup> who had been forced to move.
- Some politicians and local authorities were against the provision of humanitarian assistance to MVPs arguing that it was tantamount to endorsing their informal settlements.
- Lack of commitment from the government and its local structures in the community targeting exercise. During the early days of the emergency, there was a directive that affected people should not receive humanitarian assistance other than that provided by the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ).
- When IOM was justifying its assistance to MVPs among the local authorities, the GoZ claimed that everything was under control and there was no need for external assistance, yet humanitarian needs were increasing among the displaced populations.
- Government at times interfered in beneficiary targeting and selection through local authorities or political structures existing in the camps by pre-selecting beneficiaries and/or used already existing host community lists to receive humanitarian assistance.
- The use of selection tools, such as detailed beneficiary registration forms that would generate a comprehensive socio-demographic analysis, was not permitted in some settings by local structures and humanitarian agencies only had permission to get limited details, such as names and age.
- Beneficiary turn out and participation in the selection process varied, as the affected communities claimed that some humanitarian agencies had previously registered them for assistance, but did not follow through. This led to a drop in beneficiary confidence of humanitarian agencies.
- As various humanitarian agencies began to work in the same displacement settings there were challenges with duplication; moreover they used different selection criteria when identifying beneficiaries in need.,
- IOM registers all MVPs in the community who may be eligible for assistance yet, at times, only food is available for select vulnerable households, causing tension within the community.

**How were the challenges overcome?**

- IOM's assessment and registration tools have specific questions to help determine the type of migrant living in the communities. In addition, community mapping exercises take place where every single household is accounted for and the assessors will be able to confirm whether the households are MVPs or economic migrants. Extensive training has taken place with partners to establish clear selection criteria for MVPs.
- In an effort to improve transparency and partnership, IOM and other partners worked with community-based committees in reaching the final decision on selection.
- IOM also used faith-based organizations which had close contact with community members and found it easy to access displaced populations.
- Continually negotiations are evident between IOM and government authorities at every level from district, provincial to national levels.
- Capacity-building workshops were organized for local humanitarian agencies to provide an effective emergency response; advocacy meetings with government authorities to raise their awareness on and commitment within the response for affected communities were also organized.; This also served as an opportunity to highlight IOM's mandate, programmes and operations as an inter-governmental organization, to which the Government of Zimbabwe was a member state.
- Before assistance is provided, the targeting process, their rights and entitlements, and the process for providing assistance is explained to the community; Committees, such as food distribution committees, are also created to address any issue or represent concerns from the community.
- When engaging with an affected community, IOM and its partners from the beginning provide extensive information about the assessment process, the type of assistance which may be available,

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<sup>1</sup> IDPs are referred to as Mobile and Vulnerable Populations in Zimbabwe

and the steps, including registration, which will take place before assistance can be provided; During the registration process, the community participates in the process and will rank themselves who they consider the most vulnerable or most in need for specific types of assistance. They are then aware that all households within the community may not be eligible for individual household assistance (such as food or NFIs) however should long-term assistance (water, communal gardens etc) be implemented, all will benefit;

- Cross-cutting issues such as HIV and AIDS, gender, and sexual gender-based violence is mainstreamed within all programming, particularly within the beneficiary selection process.
- In order to avoid the duplication of beneficiaries, coordination among field-level agencies is evident.
- IOM chaired MVP working group meetings on a weekly basis in Harare; this provided a coordination mechanism for organisations to share ideas, challenges and best practices on the delivery of humanitarian assistance to MVPs countrywide. Other coordination fora were organized in various regions of the country through agencies such as OCHA.
- Joint programming with other agencies like UNICEF, FAO and CARE allowed the humanitarian community to work together and come up with better targeted assistance.

**What was the result?**

- Enriched capacity of local government authorities and local NGOs within the emergency humanitarian response.
- Increased understanding of IOM targeting criteria and operations by government and other key stakeholders; this led to more accurate targeting of eligible households and strengthened the relationship between IOM and the general public.
- Strong commitment from the GoZ; a formal clearance was granted to IOM to assist MVPs countrywide.
- Emergency humanitarian assistance was successfully provided to affected populations; Interventions towards durable solutions were provided in areas where possible.
- MVPs have a clearer understanding of who is selected and why.

**Zimbabwe**

**Government relations on camp-type situations**

During emergency assistance to Mobile Vulnerable Populations (MVP)

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

- Existence of IDPs not officially recognised by the government, hence affected populations were generally marginalised from the mainstream community.
- Difficulty in accessing Mobile and Vulnerable Populations (MVPs)<sup>2</sup> due to reluctance of local authorities, in some instances reinforced by a military presence. In many areas of the country, MVPs were seen as anti-government activists as they resulted from political violence.
- The ownership and legal status of the land where MVP are settled continues to be unresolved.
- Interference of the local authorities during the provision of emergency assistance leading to the politicisation of humanitarian aid was evident; cases of political interference have resulted in suspension of distribution of humanitarian aid with immediate negative impact on the affected communities.
- Lack of cooperation and commitment from local authorities which led to delays in the implementation of humanitarian activities.
- Intimidation of the MVPs community by authorities raising fears that they may once again be displaced.<sup>3</sup>

**How were the challenges overcome?**

- Through continued advocacy and sensitisation of the authorities on the need to address the MVP issues, IOM was able to provide assistance to affected households.
- While the involvement of the grassroots local leadership has been vital for advocating and agreeing on the modalities of assistance to MVP, it has also been important to seek support and maintain coordination from key government sectors at all levels nationwide (e.g. government structures at the ministerial levels).
- IOM conducts coordination meetings with its partners in which beneficiary targeting, implementation and monitoring strategies are highlighted. Although displacement continues to be a sensitive issue to tackle in Zimbabwe, all IOM implementing partners have been able to fully define the target group to the local authorities in their respective areas of operation by using more accepted/politically correct language.
- To facilitate better access to affected populations, each IOM implementing partner, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with local authorities in the areas of operation.
- IOM ensures a 80/20 assistance ratio between affected populations and the host community as MVPs often settled adjacent to “host” communities which are equally vulnerable, yet not been forced to move; although IOM provides assistance to the most vulnerable within the host community,
- The implementation of community stabilisation initiatives through the provision of basic facilities such as water, sanitation and durable shelter demystify the suspicion of political affiliation of affected households, as they are more widely accepted than the relief-type of interventions targeting individual households (e.g. food and NFIs).
- Access to MVPs identified as victims of political violence is still a major challenge.

**What was the result?**

- While the issue of displaced people have been treated with sensitivity in Zimbabwe, the government and local authorities have now changed their perception on the matter and agree, at certain level, on the need for humanitarian assistance to MVP communities.
- IOM uses its status to encourage other agencies to reach out to MVPs with humanitarian aid, where possible.

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<sup>2</sup> The term “IDP” is not recognized by the government hence “Mobile and Vulnerable Populations” are used to define displaced populations in the country.

<sup>3</sup> Some of the MVPs have been displaced more than once.

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- Land tenure is still part of the broader protection issues affecting displaced populations which need to be addressed by the humanitarian community.
- IOM and Government have maintained a good relationship through the involvement of local authorities in MVP settlement areas. This will only serve to facilitate greater access to MVP communities.

**Philippines (Typhoon Dorian)**

**Coordination – Building Relationships**

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

The apparent lack of local NGO membership (and local government representation, for that matter) in the cluster – NGOs being that crucial link to sustained direct service provision on the ground. This lack was attributed to several factors, the most stark was the fact that the existing players on the ground were focused on their own activities for the general affected population as a whole. More so, not having had the operational precedence of the cluster approach (where the majority of issues cross-cut within camp management and coordination) were reasonably untrained to recognize the inherent intermingling of issues that the cluster lined up to be addressed specifically for IDPs in camps/camp-like situations.

**How were the challenges overcome?**

The cluster approach briefings given by OCHA contributed significantly to raising the awareness among local players. With this impetus, the cluster undertook constant networking with all local relief agencies/players to sign up for membership, with IOM stressing the reality that the IDP situation in Bicol will definitely take longer than what they experienced in the past, and along this line, local community capacity building was a priority activity. Local community capacity building for camp management and coordination was presented within the framework of full cross-sectoral engagement and collective integration of individual agencies' support and assistance specific to IDPs in camps/camp-like situations.

**What was the result?**

The cluster membership has significantly increased, in terms of relevant service/issue/sectoral focus and representation. But more than the quantifiable demonstration of cluster membership, qualitatively, that is, the cluster as it is currently populated impressively shows a committed partisanship borne out of informed decision-making.

**Philippines (Typhoon Dorian)**

**‘Provider of Last Resort’ in Real Field Situations**

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

Financial resources, or the potential lack of it – not only for IOM, but for the rest of the cluster members, as well, and due to funding allocations earmarked for specific services, target groups, and target areas – not necessarily directly impacting on IDPs in camps.

**How were the challenges overcome – be specific?**

Within the cluster, regular rapid needs assessment reports were shared among its membership, with IOM mapping out priority current needs with the cluster membership matching such with available support and assistance. The gaps would be presented to the membership for support and assistance commitments. As provider of last resort, IOM carried out a rapid budgetary review of its financial resources and commenced on a financial re-programming strategy – re-allocating funds from transport to procurement of NFIs. This likewise provided the momentum for IOM to seek additional funding.

**What was the result?**

As of this writing:

- (a) IOM has taken on the procurement and distribution of personal hygiene kits (at regular intervals) for all IDPs in transit and evacuation sites;
- (b) procured and distributed supplementary shelter materials;
- (c) coordination of temporary shelter upgrading activities for two transit sites;
- (d) ensured collaborative and regular water delivery activities to sites; and potentially, to:
- (e) decongest remaining IDP sites by spearheading a transit land identification working group towards constructing about 1,000 temporary shelters.

**Zimbabwe**  
Provider of Last Resort  
Conflict-Induced IDPs

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

- Existence of IDPs not officially recognized by the government, hence generally marginalized from the mainstream community
- Overstretched resources for provision of comprehensive assistance countrywide – IOM and its partners are among only a few organizations with access to IDP settings in the country
- Limited or total lack of access to IDP settings in some cases
- No comprehensive assessment to establish the total number, situation and needs of IDPs in the country
- Limited number of humanitarian agencies providing assistance to IDPs, or Mobile and Vulnerable Populations (MVPs) as they are referred to in Zimbabwe, due to lack of access and sensitivity of certain caseloads
- Lack of capacitated local humanitarian agencies
- Inadequate settlement opportunities for those with affected by displacement
- Continuous volatile political and socio-economic situation within country
- IOM caught in the middle of government and donor requirements

**How were the challenges overcome?**

- The UN and IOM have engaged in dialogue with the government, even though, not all MVPs have access to humanitarian assistance due to continuous reluctance of government and local authorities in certain areas to allow access.
- IOM has put in place its emergency assistance framework that includes a household needs assessment, profiling and verification at each MVP setting prior to assistance. This has enabled IOM to create a platform for a countrywide coordinated and integrated response within accessible (camp-like) MVP communities and the inclusion of cross-cutting issues such as HIV and AIDS and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)<sup>4</sup>
- IOM established and built the capacity of a network of local NGOs, as well as community-based and faith-based organisations in emergency humanitarian response, taking advantage of their strategic and close links to targeted communities. This has enabled the positive outreach of MVP communities countrywide.
- In order to ensure a comprehensive approach to assistance within MVP communities, IOM advocates for other UN and specialised NGOs to provide technical expertise through IOM and its partners on the ground.
- IOM advocates with donors on the need to move from emergency to more sustainable livelihood assistance as an exit strategy.
- IOM works in coordination with the UN, IASC and other humanitarian agencies to advocate for land allocation and tenure for the MVP communities.
- The volatile political and socio-economic situation in the country continues to be a major challenge for the provision of humanitarian assistance. IOM uses its unique status in Zimbabwe to successfully advocate for humanitarian assistance to MVP within local structures and at the national government level.
- Given the country's volatile situation, IOM finds itself in a difficult situation – on the one hand trying to maintain good rapport with the government, while on the other hand trying to engage donors in providing longer-term/recovery interventions.

**What was the result?**

- The good network of implementing partners operating nationwide and the relationship with the government at most levels has made it possible to provide humanitarian assistance to MVP. This, however, has not always been possible in areas where there are high levels of political tension.
- IOM and its partners continue to assess the MVP situation to ensure that both household and community needs are met.

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<sup>4</sup> - The other assistance to MVP include distribution of food and NFI as well as provision of water and sanitation facilities, shelter and livelihood support for both income and food generation

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- Despite the ongoing socio-economic challenges faced by Zimbabwe, some of the MVP communities assisted since 2003 have reached a relatively stable condition indicating possible exiting from humanitarian assistance into more long-term, recovery assistance.
- As a result of IOM's capacity building initiatives, local NGOs, community-based and faith-based organisations and local authorities have increased their capacity and technical expertise within the emergency humanitarian response, using minimum SPHERE standards.
- Due to IOM's operational and timely capacity to provide assistance, IOM was appointed as the lead agency for humanitarian assistance to MVPs.
- Many specialised agencies have started to target MVP settings in their emergency response programmes, reducing the burden of 'provider of last resort' for IOM and its partners.

**Philippines (Typhoon Dorian)**

**Successful leadership/management of clusters**

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

The convening of the first cluster meeting came after other clusters were already in place on the ground. There was a bit of confusion pertinent to terminologies: camps, evacuation sites, transit sites. To start with, there were no “formal camps”. In its stead were schools (habitually transformed into evacuation centres during typhoons and volcanic disturbances), churchyard premises, and other spontaneous sites. The government’s designation of a large athletic facility as a transit site was not automatically regarded as a camp. Another challenge, and closely related to the issue of integrating cross-cutting issues, was the local players’ sectoral context of addressing issues – that because specific issues were already taken on within the wider scale, the inter-connectedness of such issues within a camp management framework were seemingly ruled out. This went as far as a suggestion from local players to fuse the camp management cluster with the shelter cluster.

**How were the challenges overcome – be specific?**

Through vigorous and sustained awareness-raising and active coordination efforts, IOM constantly briefed and re-briefed cluster members about:

- (a) the cluster approach;
- (b) the expanded concept of “camps”;
- (c) the specific situation of IDPs in the evacuation and transit sites; and
- (d) the need for “camp management”-targeted interventions.

**What was the result?**

It has become plain that the current dynamism of the cluster is a clear manifestation of the local players’ ownership of the cluster and its process, as well as, an obvious recognition of IOM’s lead role:

- (a) the cluster terms of reference, as drafted and suggested by IOM, was unanimously approved;
- (b) clear ground definitions of transit sites and evacuation sites were agreed upon; and
- (c) commitments made by cluster members for expansion of their respective sector services to include cluster-specific inter-connections.

**Somalia**

**Information Management/Protection**

**The issues:**

- How 'provider of last resort' was dealt with in real field situations.
- Managing information within the cluster and between clusters.
- Securing baseline data and country-specific information on IDPs for quality response, through **IDP Profiling**, a global pilot.

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

- The lack of systematic, acknowledged information on the conditions of IDPs in their settlements was the main motivation for the creation of the IDP Profiling Project.
- Beyond the lack of general information on IDPs, protection information never before collected or disseminated in any systematic manner.
- UNHCR as the Protection Cluster Lead was also the only agency in the cluster with a strong data management capacity.
- Individual agencies and organizations were accustomed to doing their own surveys, which created "assessment-fatigue" amongst the target population, who saw no results from the questions asked.

**How were the challenges overcome?**

- One of the major differences between the IDP profiling exercise and previous IDP assessments is the fact that data will be collected, entered into a database, analyzed, and disseminated to the entire community. The focus is on "hard data" instead of narrative reports that can be subjective and not helpful for comparing IDPs across settlements in different regions of Somalia.
- With UNHCR taking a lead role, wide consultations across clusters were ensured in the creation of the IDP household surveys to ensure that the information was collected in such a way that made the use of a database easy, and facilitated analysis—with key sectoral questions, most importantly protection-related.
- UNHCR took responsibility for receiving IDP profiling questionnaires, data-basing them, analyzing the data and disseminating findings.
- A database was designed to accept the information contained in the household questionnaires. It has a streamlined data entry component to facilitate the manual data-entry of thousands of questionnaires. It also has a reporting component to query the database to locate information of use to the humanitarian community.
- Numerous data-entry staff were hired on flexible contracts to allow us to quickly respond to a large influx of questionnaires, then reduce the staffing level in between IDP profiling exercises.
- As the project matures, the standard IDP profiling questionnaire has changed. Our database has adapted accordingly but still allows comparisons between IDP settlements in different cities.

**What was the result?**

- Information on IDPs is for the first time being collected in a standardized way, through an inter-agency mechanism, across all sectors.
- UNHCR has provided critical support to this initiative by taking the lead for all data management activities.
- The strong data management support for this high-profile initiative has raised awareness on the value of good data management practices.
- As a project, the IDP profiling project is providing valuable information, used by all clusters to plan their programming in IDP settlements.



**Somalia**

**Information Management and Inter-Cluster Coordination**

**The issues:**

- Successful cross-cluster coordination mechanisms
- Consolidating technical tools for the improvement of humanitarian, protection-focused operations in Somalia.

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

- There were several UN agencies with a GIS or Information Management capacity working in Somalia. However, in general, there was little interaction among them, resulting in massive duplication of efforts, and inconsistencies between maps and databases produced by different agencies making it difficult to share information.
- There was no clear office or organization to take the lead in the coordination of Data management activities.

**How were the challenges overcome?**

- Together with FAO-SWALIM, UNHCR formed an informal working group, called the **Somalia Interagency Mapping and Coordination working group (SIMaC)**. Invited to participate were agencies with a strong GIS capacity.
- The group was kept very informal, and consisted of a mailing list which served as a mechanism for professionals to keep in touch with each other and request data, technical support, disseminate data, maps, etc. We also held occasional meetings to come to agreement on certain issues, to discuss our activities, and to coordinate our response during emergencies.

**What was the result?**

- For the first time in years, there is an agreed-upon list of administrative units in Somalia. Not only does this harmonize all our maps, but standardize our databases and data collection making it easier for all of us to share information between agencies and across clusters.
- Mechanisms were put in place for us to easily share data between agencies, thereby reducing the duplication of efforts and highlighting gaps.
- Metadata and other data sharing protocols were implemented and standardized.
- New data management/GIS professionals arriving to the Somalia emergency can quickly “get up to speed” by interacting with the SIMaC and seeing who is doing what and where.
- The SIMaC has grown from a core group of about 5 agencies to include many other organizations including other UN agencies, NGOs, USAID, the US gov., and local organizations.
- The SIMaC has just decided to put the lessons learned and accomplishments realized in Somalia to work for the entire region. Finally there will be a mechanism for close coordination between data management professionals for the entire East Africa/Horn of Africa region.
- The SIMaC has also decided to attempt to implement a UN Spatial Data Infrastructure (SDI) for the region which will provide the technical tools, and the necessary administrative agreements for UN agencies to work more closely together than they ever have in the past. This initiative has been discussed at the global level for years, but will hopefully be successfully implemented for the first time, here in Nairobi.

**Somalia**

**Cluster Partnership, Leadership and Information Management**

**The issues:**

- Successfully engaging “partners”
- Successful leadership/management of cluster groups
- Managing information within the Protection Cluster and between clusters, on new (and protracted) displacements through **Population Movement Tracking (PMT)**—incorporated as of 2007 into Protection Monitoring Network.

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

- Lack of systematic information on locations, numbers, and condition of IDPs in Somalia.
- No established mechanism for timely information on new displacement.
- Limited / No access to IDP populations in Somalia.
- Multiple emergencies and reasons for movement (i.e. Drought, Floods, Conflict, Returns, Seasonal Movements, etc...)
- Lack of professional capacity of local NGOs.

**How were the challenges overcome?**

- Local NGO’s were identified based on their motivation to participate without funding, and based their capacity to quantitatively and qualitatively inform on population movements. By the end of 2006, there were 32 active local partners.
- They were then trained to use the data collection form. They meet at monthly coordination meetings called by UNHCR in the field, and receive feed back from our Branch Office in Nairobi—both on individual movement reports and for overall technical guidance. From the beginning, they have consistently been the major source of information on IDP movements.
- A standardized data collection form was created and subsequently revised to be an easy-to-use form containing a standard vocabulary for geographic areas, reasons for displacement, etc. The form allows us to collect and compare information from many different partners from all parts of the country. All this data is entered into our database for compilation, processing, and analysis.
- To work around the lack of Geographic data in Somalia, the Grid Reference system was developed to identify sub-district locations.
- A data management system was developed to ensure fast and efficient use of data as it arrives from our partners.
- To support local NGOs with very limited resources we established a Small Grant Fund to provide resources to help our partners pay for their monitoring activities.

**What was the result?**

- UNHCR, on behalf of the Protection Cluster, disseminates this information on IDPs (their locations, their numbers, their areas of origin, their reasons for moving, their needs, and their coping mechanisms) systematically through (1) Monthly PMT Reports consisting of a map, a report and a grid/matrix, and (2) Weekly Updates (with increased frequency if the situation demands). UNHCR also responds quickly with details to ad hoc queries, which we receive on almost a daily basis.
- For the first time, the humanitarian community has timely, reliable, and systematic information on IDP movements, motivating better planned and targeted response.
- Through this project we have engaged in capacity building and helped our partners become more

professional and consistent in their reporting and dealings with international organizations.

- UNHCR is meeting its obligations as the Protection Cluster Lead, through the provision of information of one of the most vulnerable groups in Somalia. UNHCR has become the community's leading authority on population movements and its reports and information are now used across all clusters, by the UN, NGOs, Donors, and Governments.

**Timor Leste**

**Camp Management Mobile Teams**

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

According to an initial assessment of camps carried out, it was clear that Site Liaison Support (SLS) from other organizations (mainly INGOs) were in need of assistance as they were under resourced to maintain a permanent or regular presence in the camps. Thus, camp management operational capacity varied between each camp. The majority of the SLSs who managed camps did not have a permanent presence in the camps but visited the camps regularly. The capacity, both in terms of expertise and human resources varied among SLSs. Given the SLS system arose to meet the immediate needs during initial displacement, many organizations volunteered for the role of SLS in the recognition that some support was better than none. SLSs were careful to only agree to very broad terms of reference that focused on providing a liaison between the camp population and service providers. A more 'orthodox' role for SLSs vis-à-vis camp management was purposely avoided.

Some SLSs, recognizing that they did not have the capacity to cope with camp management, handed over these responsibilities to other SLSs to enable them to concentrate on their normal programmes in long-term development.

**How were the challenges overcome?**

*Camp management mobile teams* were created to assist in the following key areas:

1. Conduct assessments/surveys in designated camps and in conjunction with the relevant SLS and in accordance with Government strategies in Dili to ascertain or identify the needs of groups in relation to return and to initiate dialogues with the relevant communities of return and engage service providers and security stakeholders in the process to identify impediments and address these issue to ensure sustainability;
2. Conduct assessments in communities on areas where the government would like to relocate IDPs into transitional shelter which may result in further displacement or discord among communities;
3. In coordination with the Protection Working Group, UNHCR and the Human Rights Ombudsman, to establish a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to measure the impact of the return process;

**What was the result?**

- The camp management mobile team has been able to provide support to NGOs in two sites identified by the Government and other humanitarian actors as of particular concern due to health and security risks. In this regard, working together with the Ministry of Labour and the NGOs to identify and support families wishing to seek alternative durable or provisional shelter arrangements.
- The mobile team has assisted the Government to rapidly respond to new displacement, conducting assessment at newly created sites and informing the Government and other service providers of the immediate needs in these sites.
- The mobile team supported the Government and service providers to conduct assessments in all sectors as needed. For example, the mobile team assisted Oxfam in water and sanitation assessments. The mobile team also conducted child protection assessments in designated camps, as well as assessments of transitional shelter sites.
- The mobile team has assisted NGOs by creating and strengthening mechanisms of information-sharing between the Government and IDPs. This has aided the Government in developing more well-informed policies addressing the concerns of IDPs in some of the more sensitive camps.

**Timor-Leste**

**Conflict Sensitive Approach to Camp Management  
& Return and Reintegration**

**What were the main challenges that needed to be addressed?**

While the initial crisis that led to the civil unrest and eventual displacement of over a tenth of the country's population was initially seen a 'purely political' in nature, experience in the field quickly revealed that the underlying conflict dynamics were complicated and were community specific.

Social jealousy is prevalent in Timor-Leste as Timorese society is composed of tightly knit communities in which rumors often lead to misunderstandings. The provision of services and assistance to IDPs living in camps, for example, has the potential to lead to further conflict. These factors, coupled with the poverty, unemployment and other hardships faced by the inhabitants of Dili and host communities in the districts, underline the need for extreme caution in the development of interventions which seek to address the needs of IDPs. This holds true to provision of assistance to returning IDPs and for the management of return and reintegration activities. The social context requires that agents actively seek to understand underlying conflict factors at the community level. This greater understanding of the likely response to outside interventions should inform programme development.

Given the need to better understand the conflict dynamics, the low level of expertise available among local and Government counterparts to conduct a methodical assessment of those factors proved a challenge.

**How were the challenges overcome?**

IOM sought to compliment its camp management and coordination experience with a local partner (BELUN) with extensive experience in the developing and conducting conflict assessments. IOM, together with its local partner undertook rapid conflict assessments of camps and critical communities.

Teams were deployed to critical camps and communities to conduct assessments that aimed at identifying the potential for conflict (and their trigger) in camps. Communities (some of which neighbored IDP centers and some of which likely hosted IDPs) suffering from particularly serious violence were also visited, as were communities that were apparently unscathed by the violence. An effort was made to determine factors that led to social cohesion that 'protected' communities. The results of the assessments were widely circulated to the Government and other stakeholders. IOM also conducted a survey of 'positive activities' in all hamlets in Dili. The survey also captured data on the stated willingness to accept the return of IDPs.

In Hera IOM/BELUN worked closely with IDPs and the community and was able to facilitate dialogue and trust-building activities that led to the eventual return of over 1,200 IDPs. Realising that sustainable return requires more than protection monitoring, IOM/BELUN have remained engaged with the community, with particular attention given to support to local Government structures, and have assisted the village to access Government resources for livelihood and other projects.

**What was the result?**

Camp managers, Government counterparts and other local and international humanitarian agencies were provided information on the potential conflict factors in camps. This information, sought to ascertain the principle antagonists in each setting, the origin of the conflict from the perception of those involved (e.g. focusing on discussions of the how perceptions of the political armed forces/police conflict or 'East/West' divide of Dili expressed themselves in violent conflict). It was interesting to find for example that in some instances persons from the East were allowed to remain in predominantly Western areas despite the expulsion of other members of the community. This seemed to indicate that other underlying factors (or a likely mixture of factors) had led to the violent expulsion of sectors of the community. The findings of the conflict assessments in turn informed subsequent service delivery strategies based on identified sector needs (e.g. health, shelter and food).

Dialogue initiatives were informed by analysis of both the camp and community environment. It is likely that this level of information increased the likelihood of success of such activities. The IOM/BELUN partnership enabled experienced facilitators to guide discussions so that underlying issues of concern could be addressed. It should be recognized that mediation of difficult discussions and sensitive dialogues should, whenever possible be led by persons with the adequate methodological tools. As always, well meaning interventions could otherwise lead to negative results. While it is rare that agencies integrate this skill set into the staffing table for emergency response, the experience in this setting was extremely valuable.

Field-level information provided to the Government and other partners resulted in better policy/strategy development in regards to return and reintegration activities and dialogue initiatives.

At the end of the 12-month period, it is expected that selected newly-elected Village Council will have become more relevant to their communities and will be better placed to identify and manage potential areas of conflict.

**Timor-Leste**

**IDP Response amidst Inter-Communal Conflict**

Focusing only on humanitarian needs of IDP camps will not address the underlying causes of the conflict, which often stems from grievances within communities. Communities have been identified as key stakeholders in facilitating the return and reintegration of the IDPs as well as acting as safeguards to mitigate against further gang violence. Local and international organisations, including CARE, need to support positive local initiatives, especially in the communities adjacent to the camps to create an enabling environment that will allow for dialogue, reconciliation and reintegration.

Distribution of food and non-food items at the IDP camps and in the districts, targeting IDPs only, has created a large amount of social jealousy, especially since many poor and vulnerable people do not necessarily live at the camps but have lost property during the conflict. The Government, through the MTRC and with support from international organisations, is currently changing the food distribution policy to focus on vulnerable groups.

As CARE is not directly responsible for camp management, ensuring proper camp management is more time-consuming because it requires discussion and dialogue with the camp managers who are not aid workers and do not always immediately agree with suggestions put forward by external organisations. This needs to be taken into account when planning and monitoring project progress.

The displacement problem in Dili is not a typical IDP situation. People who fled their homes are IDPs within their own town and are able to move around during the day, as the security situation permits. Many people would only stay in the camps at night or during periods of violence but would go about their day-to-day work at their houses or relatives' homes. This transient situation has to be taken into account when planning and implementing program activities, and deciding who the eligible beneficiary population is.



**CCCM Tool Annex**

**ACTIVATION OF RAPID RESPONSE TEAMS TO FLOOD AFFECTED DISTRICTS**

	per team	total
<b>1. Logs</b>		
1.1 Four by Four vehicle	1	4
<b>2. Living</b>		
2.1 Tent	2	8
2.2 Foldable Cot	4	16
2.3 Bedding	4	16
2.4 Water Cooler (5-10 liter)	2	8
2.5 Medical Kit	1	4
2.6 Cooking Utensils	1	4
2.7 Gas Burner	1	4
2.8 Gas Cylinder	1	4
<b>3. Coms</b>		
3.1 Laptop	1	4
3.2 Began	1	4
3.3 GPS	1	4
3.4 Thuraya	1	4
3.5 Digital Camera	1	4
3.6 Paktel Sim Card	3	12
3.7 Memory Stick (1 gb)	1	4
<b>4. Misc</b>		
4.1 IOM Notebooks	3	12
4.2 Battery Powered Emergency Light	1	4
4.3 Batteries	20 set of AA, 10 sets of whatever size the emergency light requires	
4.4 Insect Repellent	4	16
4.5 ORS	100 packets	400
4.6 Gatorade Powder	100 packets	400
4.7 IOM Vests	4	16
4.8 IOM Hats	4	16
4.9 IOM Shirts	8	32



**TOR for IDP Response Officer  
IOM Zimbabwe**

Since 2003 IOM has been leading the response to the needs of mobile and vulnerable populations in Zimbabwe, through a combination of direct implementation and coordinating the response of implementing partners. The National Camp Coordination and Camp Management Officer will coordinate the response among humanitarian actors in MVP settings across Zimbabwe and under the supervision of the Head of Emergency and Reintegration Unit be tasked with the following responsibilities:

- Establish and chair the mobile and vulnerable population (MVP) working group with key humanitarian actors on a monthly basis;
- Develop a system to identify newly displaced populations and report on these to relevant stakeholders;
- In coordination with relevant stakeholders, ensure that assessments are conducted to identify the needs and assistance gaps within affected communities, taking into consideration minimum national and international (SPHERE) standards;
- Establish and maintain an information management system that allows partners to access and share operational data.
- Establish a “who does what where” tool to ensure that the needs of displaced populations are met and coordinated with all relevant stakeholders;
- Review and assist in the development of proposals from humanitarian actors operating in IOM coordinated MVP settings.
- In coordination with the M&E Unit, establish a system of monitoring assistance and recommending phased assistance from Relief to Recovery and communicate this to relevant stakeholders
- Coordinate access for humanitarian stakeholders with local authorities, including advocacy for security of tenure;
- Coordinate transition of humanitarian assistance between humanitarian partners to ensure minimal disruption in meeting the needs of beneficiaries
- Consolidate and provide regular reports on mobile and vulnerable populations to the Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC);
- Develop briefing notes/situational analysis of MVP settings for donors and other stakeholders;
- Coordinate training and capacity building initiatives for humanitarian actors engaged in MVP assistance
- Assist in the review and revision of assessment, targeting tools and methodologies for MVPs
- Coordinate with the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit to consolidate regular MVP community profiles and create spatial mapping tools for informing humanitarian operations.
- Generate and maintain an up-to-date geographical locator list for MVPs enabling accurate mapping of MVPs
- Advise the Head of Unit on programme-related issues.
- Perform any other work related duties as may be assigned by the Head of Unit or Chief of Mission.

**Conclusion and Way Forward**

The Best Practices reviewed above provide a solid foundation for concept and tool exchange on IDP response techniques in camps and camp-like settings. Participants from the 2007 CCCM Validation

CCCM DRAFT 26 March 2008

Workshop held in Dar es Salaam Tanzania identified key areas of future focus for the CCCM Best Practice document. The table below describes these areas for future study, research and eventual inclusion in this text.

Country	Topic	Focal Point	Volunteer
Georgia	Collective Centres and Durable Solutions		
Pakistan	Mobile Teams		
Uganda	Exit Strategies		Yumiko
Ethiopia/Somalia	Mobile Teams		
Somalia	CA/CM/CC Relationships		
Tanzania (refugees)	Camp Closure/Population Movement		
Zimbabwe	Provider of last resort		Diana
Zimbabwe	Durable solutions and permanent 'camps'		Diana
Zimbabwe	Government relations on camp situations		Diana
Zimbabwe	Community targeting and participation		Diana
Pakistan	When is a Camp a Camp? <i>When do they stop being camps?</i>		
Pakistan	Role of Government – camp decision making process		
Serbia	Long-term Collective Centres- the Government view		
Montenegro	Collective centres/durable solutions and settlements.	UNHCR- Gordana Popovic	Belinda
Iraq	Remote Management		
Sri Lanka	Camp management in insecure area	Elizabeth (UNHCR) Tan	

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Georgia	Collective centres in the National Policy on IDPs	Erin Mooney/Louise Taylor (PROCAP)	
Rwanda	Durable solutions/settlements- the challenges		Diana
Burundi	Policy framework for assistance to camps (post-‘regroupement’)		Belinda
Uganda	How to reach consensus on camp population/numbers		Yumiko
Uganda	Camp management training initiatives		Yumiko
Uganda	Challenges of the Referral system		Yumiko
Uganda	Challenges of standardized monitoring tools/regional differences		Yumiko
Uganda	Activation		Yumiko
Philippines	Activation		
Ethiopia	Activation		
Lebanon	Activation		